Q: After a major outage, you're asked to lead the Post-Incident Review (also called a "Postmortem"). What is the SRE approach to postmortems, and what must the document contain?
SRE postmortems are blameless—they focus on systemic failures, not individual mistakes. The goal is learning and preventing recurrence, not assigning blame.
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🛠️ Production Runbook & Step-by-Step Resolution
Direct Answer: "We encountered this OS-level bottleneck during peak traffic and diagnosed it down to kernel and filesystem metrics. The interviewer is testing: Blameless postmortem culture, incident learning, documentation standards.. I structure my answer around systematic triage first, root cause analysis second, and permanent remediation third."
Initial Diagnostics & Root Cause Analysis
SRE postmortems are blameless—they focus on systemic failures, not individual mistakes. The goal is learning and preventing recurrence, not assigning blame.
- Title and severity: Clear description and impact level (e.g., "P1: Payment API 45-minute outage").
- Summary: One-paragraph overview of what happened.
- Impact: Quantified damage—users affected, revenue lost, SLO budget consumed, duration.
- Timeline: Minute-by-minute chronology from detection to resolution:
- Root cause analysis: The "5 Whys" method or fault tree analysis to find the true systemic root cause—not "engineer made a mistake," but "the deployment pipeline lacked config validation."
- Contributing factors: What made detection slow? What made recovery harder?
Remediation & Permanent Safeguards
A postmortem document must contain: The postmortem is shared openly across the organization. Recurring themes across postmortems indicate systemic reliability gaps.
14:02 — Monitoring alert fires for 5xx rate > 5%
14:05 — On-call acknowledges, begins investigation
14:12 — Root cause identified: bad config deployed
14:15 — Config rollback initiated
14:22 — Service fully recovered
- Action items: Each must have an owner, priority, and deadline:
[P0] Add config validation to CI pipeline — @alice — 2 weeks[P1] Improve alerting threshold — @bob — 1 week- Lessons learned: What went well, what went poorly.
- Title and severity: Clear description and impact level (e.g., "P1: Payment API 45-minute outage").
- Summary: One-paragraph overview of what happened.
- Impact: Quantified damage—users affected, revenue lost, SLO budget consumed, duration.
Senior hiring managers and bar raisers evaluate how you prioritize during outages. Avoid these common anti-patterns:
- Issuing immediate kill -9 (SIGKILL) commands rather than allowing graceful termination via kill -15 (SIGTERM) when configuring major outage youre SIGKILL immediately halts execution without allowing processes to flush memory buffers, commit database transactions, or remove stale PID locks.
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Overlooking file system inode exhaustion (df -i) when diagnosing 'No space left on device' errors when configuring major outage youre
Millions of small files or unrotated session tokens can exhaust available file system inodes even when standard disk storage (
df -h) shows ample free space. - Exhausting open file descriptor allocations (ulimit -n) under intensive concurrent socket connections when configuring major outage youre Reaching file descriptor exhaustion throws 'Too many open files' errors, preventing services from accepting new TCP client socket connections.
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Permitting defunct zombie processes to accumulate without fixing parent process SIGCHLD waitpid reaping when configuring major outage youre
Zombie processes consume process table entries; accumulating zombies can exhaust the system maximum PID limit (
pid_max).